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Optimal Offering Strategies for Wind Power in
Energy and Primary Reserve Markets
Tiago Soares, Pierre Pinson, Senior Member, IEEE, Tue V. Jensen, and Hugo Morais, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Wind power generation is to play an important role
in supplying electric power demand, and will certainly impact
the design of future energy and reserve markets. Operators of
wind power plants will consequently develop adequate offering
strategies, accounting for the market rules and the operational
capabilities of the turbines, e.g., to participate in primary reserve
markets. We consider two different offering strategies for joint
participation of wind power in energy and primary reserve mar-
kets, based on the idea of proportional and constant splitting of
potentially available power generation from the turbines. These
offering strategies aim at maximizing expected revenues from both
market floors using probabilistic forecasts for wind power genera-
tion, complemented with estimated regulation costs and penalties
for failing to provide primary reserve. A set of numerical exam-
ples, as well as a case-study based on real-world data, allows
illustrating and discussing the properties of these offering strate-
gies. An important conclusion is that, even though technically
possible, it may not always make sense for wind power to aim at
providing system services in a market environment.
Index Terms—Ancillary services, decision-making under
uncertainty, electricity markets, offering strategies, wind power.
NOMENCLATURE
The main notation used throughout the paper is stated next for
quick reference. Other symbols are defined as required.
A. Variables
α Proportional strategy split for energy and reserve
λ Prices and costs in the electricity market
E Energy
P Power (reserve)
Q Total amount bid into day-ahead stage [MW]
R Total revenue
T Regulation energy market revenue
W Potential penalty for primary reserve market
B. Indices
+ Positive imbalance (downward regulation)
− Negative imbalance (upward regulation)
∗ Available energy/power at real-time stage
bpt Penalty cost for reserve imbalance [C/MW]
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c Contracted energy/power at day-ahead stage
cap Reserve price at day-ahead stage [C/MW]
obs Total eventually observed power [MWh]
pt Penalty for reserve imbalance [C/MW]
r Fixed reserve [MW]
sp Spot market
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE continuous deployment of wind power generationcapacities in several countries, and especially in coun-
tries like Denmark, has an increasing impact on power sys-
tem operation and electricity markets. For instance according
to Energinet.dk (the Danish Transmission System Operator
– TSO), December 2013 was an exceptional month where,
on average, 54.8% of the electrical energy consumption was
supplied by wind power [1]. According the same report, on
December 1st, an extreme scenario with wind generation equal
to 136% of the Danish power consumption was observed.
In the future, situations with very high wind (and most cer-
tainly also solar) generation will be more and more common,
resulting in new challenges in power system operation [2]. The
variability and limited predictability of wind power genera-
tion force the system operator to procure additional reserves
to ensure adequate reliability of the electric power system [3].
However, according to [4] among others, wind power plants are
able to provide reserves themselves, thereby reducing the addi-
tional procurement of reserves from other traditional resources.
Thus, new mechanisms for reserve procurement, as well as
for the participation of wind generation in providing reserves
should be developed and implemented [5], [6]. Currently, wind
turbine technology and wind farm control allow providing dis-
tinct ancillary services such as frequency and voltage control.
Thus wind farms are able (i) to provide and control active power
injection in a few seconds, (ii) to respond to reactive power
demands in less than 1 second, (iii) to support and maintain
voltage levels, and (iv) to provide kinetic energy (virtual inertia)
[4], [7]–[9].
Traditionally, primary reserve markets are designed to assist
in dampening deviations from nominal frequency. Generators
supply the service based on their inertia characteristics.
Depending on the country rules, this service can either be
supplied and priced through market mechanisms [4] or made
mandatory without payment. With high penetration of variable
generation, the service design tends to change, since reserve
requirements may dynamically vary on an hourly or even
minute basis [10], while the system may have lower inertia.
Wind power plants and other emerging generating technologies
1949-3029 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
may then be asked to contribute to this new service design
[11], [12].
For optimal integration of wind power in energy and primary
reserve markets, new business models and remuneration mech-
anisms should be thought of. The literature on optimal offering
strategies for wind power producers in the day-ahead market
while accounting for potential balancing costs has been flour-
ishing over the last few years. This includes a number of studies
(assuming that wind power producer act as a price-taker) on
expected utility maximization strategies [13], [14], additional
consideration on risk-aversion and temporal dependencies [15],
extension to LMP markets [16] and multi-period setting to
adjust contracted offerings [17], appraisal of uncertainties on
both wind and market quantities [18], bidding under one-price
and two-price system [19], generalized opportunity cost bid-
ding [20], as well as minimizing imbalance costs accounting
for wind power predictions and imbalance prices [21], among
others. Although it is not the goal of the present paper to work
on optimal strategies assuming that the wind power producer
acts as a price-maker, readers are encouraged to consult these
recent works [22]–[27] for detailed information.
In contrast, little attention has been paid to the joint offer-
ing under uncertainty of wind power generation in both energy
and reserve markets [12], [28]. Liang et al. [12] proposes an
analytical approach (based on the so called multi-newsvendor
problem with budget constraint) for wind power participating in
energy and reserve, assuming that offers for energy and reserve
can be freely determined (i.e., independently of any control
paradigm), since only subject to this budget constraint. Such
joint offering strategies are expected to bring additional rev-
enue streams to wind power plant operators. However, wind
power plants face the challenge to guarantee that power sched-
uled as primary reserve is available at any time without failure.
The reserve market is designed to ensure the operation of elec-
tric power systems with appropriate levels of stability, safety,
quality, reliability and competitiveness. In this way, intermit-
tent energy resources, such as wind power, have difficulties to
ensure and fulfil power scheduled as primary reserve. Thus, a
future reserve market must be designed to account for the possi-
bility of wind failing to provide reserve, e.g. through penalties,
if wind (or demand-response) is to participate in these markets.
This paper proposes an analytical approach for wind power
participating in both energy and primary reserve markets tak-
ing into account the market penalties. The aim is to maximize
the expected revenue from optimal offering on both energy
and primary reserve markets. Our approach takes a different
starting point is compared to previous work in the literature,
e.g. [12], as instead of considering a budget constraint for the
joint offering of energy and reserves, we first start from the
various control paradigms described in the literature for wind
to offer system services in practice. A major contribution of
this work is the implementation, evaluation and comparison
of two different offering strategies, namely the proportional
and the constant wind strategies proposed in [29], [30], for
the splitting of potentially available wind power considering
the same wind distribution probability for the two services. In
practice, they are easy to implement since uses simple con-
trollers due to the locking of energy and reserve quantities
[30], while strategies that utilize all operational degrees of
freedom would require advanced controllers that are unlikely
to admit analytical treatment, and may be highly susceptible
of misestimate due to forecast errors. An advantage of our
approach is then to show how offering behavior and market rev-
enues can be highly affected by the control paradigm originally
adopted. Both strategies are introduced with the motivation
of allowing the split of the available wind power for energy
and reserve. Furthermore, an economical evaluation of both
strategies illustrating their advantages and inconveniences is
undertaken. Optimal offers are determined under uncertainty
based on probabilistic forecasts of potential power generation
for the market time unit considered. Additional input variables
include expected market prices (for energy and reserve) as well
as expected penalties on balancing and reserve mechanisms.
The methodology is applied and demonstrated on numerical
examples. Wind power plants increase their profit by using
these strategies for optimally offering in energy and reserve
markets, thereby reducing the deviation penalties from the bal-
ancing market. Additionally, these strategies seek to motivate
wind power penetration on power system, thereby, increasing
the competition in both markets, as well as ensuring a cheap
resource in the system operator standpoint. Besides that, future
wind power plants will be able to provide fast reserve services
that will be crucial in the operation of future power systems
with high penetration of renewable resources [12]. Thus, sys-
tem operators have interest in wind power participating in both
energy and reserve markets.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II describes
electricity markets characteristics with a perspective on future
energy and reserve market trends. Section III presents the
detailed formulation of joint offering strategies (for propor-
tional and constant strategies) in energy and primary reserve
markets. Section IV describes our empirical investigation based
on a set of numerical examples. Section V assembles the most
important conclusions.
II. WIND POWER IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
A. Current Day-Ahead and Balancing Market
The increasing penetration of wind power generation in
electric power systems has been changing wholesale market
characteristics. In Denmark, wind power producers trade in
the wholesale market and are remunerated through a combi-
nation of market price and premium [28]. This remuneration
mechanism allows wind power owners to submit bids into the
day-ahead market with zero or negative prices [29].
The balancing market is used to compensate for energy devi-
ations in real time from the day-ahead and intra-day schedules.
In a European context these are run by the local TSO [30]. For
the example of Denmark, this market is cleared just before the
operating hour and is divided into a regulating power market
(where the system operator purchases the required regulating
power to balance the system) and a balancing power market
(where correction of the system and market participant imbal-
ances is performed) [31]. For the case of wind power, the
balancing market is the final mechanism permitting to mitigate
forecast errors, and it can be highly penalizing.
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Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the market structure for the wind offering
strategies.
B. Joint Offering in Energy and Primary Reserve Markets
Currently and even more in the future, wind power plants
will be able to provide some type of ancillary services, such as
frequency and voltage control [4]. Wind power plants are will-
ing to participate in energy and primary reserve market only
in the case where wind power producers may receive increased
benefits from joint market participation, instead of participat-
ing in the energy market only. With that objective in mind,
we will examine an analytical model for obtaining the optimal
quantile bid of wind power participating in multiple markets
with different expected prices and penalties for deviation from
schedule.
The energy and reserve markets have different character-
istics. On the one hand, wind energy bids submitted in the
day-ahead market should account for potential imbalance sit-
uations and their asymmetric penalties. On the other hand, bids
submitted in the primary reserve market are to accommodate
the possibility to fail in providing the service, certainly associ-
ated with a much higher penalty. Fig. 1 presents the structure of
the market for the offering strategies determination.
The bids submitted at the day-ahead market consider the
expected costs in the balancing stage. In the formulation out-
lined here, the effect which the day-ahead bid has on the
penalties of the balancing market, known as the time coupling
effect, is not captured. We assume that any differences arising
from this effect cancel out over time.
The formulation considers the important assumption of the
split between energy and primary reserve remain the same in
both day-ahead (αc) and balancing stages (α∗). This allows
us to develop an analytical formulation to solve the prob-
lem. Future work may involve stochastic programming [32]
allowing different energy and reserve share between day-ahead
and balancing stages, thereby, reducing the time coupling
effect.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. General Formulation of Market Revenues
The objective function to be optimized directly relates to
the maximization of the combined revenue from day-ahead
and reserve markets considering the penalties from the bal-
ancing market. Time indices are not used, since all variables
and parameters are for the same market time unit. This com-
bined revenue R in real-time for a given wind power producer
is expressed as
R = λspE∗ + λcapP ∗ − T ∗ −W ∗ (1)
where λsp is the spot price, E∗ is the amount of delivered
energy, λcap is the capacity price for primary reserve alloca-
tion, P ∗ is the deployed level of primary reserve in real-time,
T ∗ is the regulation costs from the regulation market and W ∗
is the penalty cost for wind power plant failing to provide the
scheduled primary reserve.
In addition, we assume that the wind power producer acts
as a price-taker. This means that the production of the wind
power producer is independent of market prices and penalties.
Because of this independence, and the fact that all prices enter
linearly in the expressions below, all calculations depend only
on the expected mean prices, rather than their full distribution.
This reduction follows from certainty equivalent theory [36],
and removes the need for a full stochastic description of prices
using, e.g., scenarios [18]. In the following, we will refer to
the sum of λspE∗ and λcapP ∗ as the expected inflow. In par-
allel, the sum of T ∗ and W ∗ is referred to as expected costs.
Subtracting the expected costs from the expected inflow yields
the expected revenue of the wind power producer. In (1), the
regulation costs are defined as
T ∗ =
{
λ∗,+ (E∗ − Ec) , E∗ − Ec ≥ 0
−λ∗,− (E∗ − Ec) , E∗ − Ec < 0 (2)
where (E∗−Ec) is the energy imbalance between the energy
delivered E∗ and the energy contracted (offered) Ec. The vari-
ables λ∗,+ and λ∗,−− are the regulation unit costs for positive
and negative deviations, i.e.,
λ∗,+ = λsp − λc,+
λ∗,− = λc,− − λsp (3)
where λc,+ is the unit down-regulation price for being long,
while λc,−− is the up-regulation price for being short.
We place ourselves here in under two-price settlement rule,
as in the NordPool [13]. In cases where the system imbalance
is negative (energy surplus – need for downward regulation), it
holds that
λc,+ ≤ λsp
λc,− = λsp
(4)
In contrast, when system imbalance is positive (energy deficit
– need of upward regulation), one has
λc,+ = λsp
λc,− ≥ λsp (5)
While finally during hours of perfect balance both λc,+ and
λc,−− are equal to the spot price λsp. In parallel, the penalty
costs for reserve imbalance can be written as
W ∗ =
{
λbpt,+ (P ∗ − P c) , P ∗ − P c ≥ 0
−λbpt,− (P ∗ − P c) , P ∗ − P c < 0 (6)
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Fig. 2. Proportional wind offering strategy (reproduced with authorization
from [29], [30]).
where (P ∗−P c) is the primary reserve power imbalance
between the realized level of reserve P ∗ and the reserve
contracted (offered) P c. λbpt,+ is a unit penalty when wind
producer generator more power than the contracted (surplus),
and λbpt,−− is the unit penalty cost when wind power producer
generate less than contracted. These are given by
λbpt,+ = λcap − λpt,+
λbpt,− = λpt,− − λcap (7)
hence λpt,+= 0 since (extra) positive reserve is not detrimental
to the system’s reliability. λpt,−− is the penalty for negative
reserve imbalance, weighted by the probability that reserve is
needed.
In principle, a wind power producer can bid any Ec,P c ≥ 0
into the day-ahead market, and choose to deliver any amount
E∗,P ∗ ≥ 0 in real time, bounded by E∗+P ∗ ≤ Eobs, the
observed energy. To make the problem analytically tractable,
we proceed by constraining the choice of E∗ and P ∗ based
on Ec and P c. This restriction is performed through the use
of two known strategies, which have been previously shown
to be operationally feasible [26], [27]. The following subsec-
tions define these strategies, while the analytical optimal bids
are finally given.
B. Proportional Wind Offering Strategy
The proportional wind offering strategy (illustrated in Fig. 2)
consists in a proportional curtailment of available power gener-
ation to yield an energy offer Ec and a primary reserve offer P c
[29], where
Ec = αcQ
P c = (1− αc)Q (8)
In the above, Q denotes the total power bid in MW for that
market time unit and αc is the strategy parameter controlling
the proportional split between energy and primary reserve bids.
This last parameter naturally varies between 0 (for full reserve
allocation) and 1 (for full energy allocation).
Fig. 3. Constant wind offering strategy (reproduced with authorization from
[29], [30]).
On the other hand, the eventually observed wind power pro-
duction Eobs is similarly composed of an energy portion E∗
and P ∗ the amount of primary reserve actually available,
E∗ = α∗Eobs
P ∗ = (1− α∗)Eobs (9)
where α∗ is the strategy parameter used when reaching real-
time operation. It is assumed that strategy parameter in day-
ahead and real-time are the same α∗=αc.
C. Constant Wind Offering Strategy
The constant wind offering strategy (Fig. 3) is based on a
constant curtailment of energy when the expected energy pro-
duced is over a certain expected level of wind power [26],
where
Ec = Q− P c
P c = PR
(10)
PR is the amount of fixed reserve to be submitted in the pri-
mary reserve market, and X% is the percentage of installed
wind power.
Similar to the proportional strategy, the observed wind pro-
duction Eobs is related to E∗. The reserve amount is assumed
to be constant and fixed in day-ahead decision. That is, prior-
ity delivery of the reserve is assumed. The delivered amount of
energy and primary reserve may be written as
E∗ = Eobs − P ∗
P ∗ = P r
(11)
IV. ANALYTICAL DERIVATION OF OPTIMAL BIDS
A. Proportional Strategy Optimization Problem
Assuming that the wind power plant acts as a price-taker,
the maximization of its expected revenues is equivalent to the
minimization of the expectation of regulation and penalty costs.
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
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Optimal offers are then the solution of
(Q˜, α˜c)= arg
E
min
Q,αc
{T ∗ +W ∗ − λspE∗ − λcapP ∗} (12)
The loss function in the above comprises an extended version
of that used in [13], where here, the available wind power is
split into two different market products. The share of the avail-
able expected power αc and observed power α∗ for energy and
reserve participation is the same (α∗ = αc). Consequently, the
total expected costs O are given by
O (Q,αc) =
∫ Q
0
⎡
⎢⎣
λ∗,−αc (Q− x)+
λbpt,− (1− αc) (Q− x)−
λspαcx− λcap (1− αc)x
⎤
⎥⎦f (x) dx
+
∫ 1
Q
[
λ∗,+αc (x−Q)−
λspαcx− λcap (1− αc)Q
]
f (x) dx
(13)
where f(x) is the forecast probability density function of the
wind power plant production. To analytically solve the prob-
lem the Leibniz rule is used. The Leibniz rule, for an arbitrary
function f , parameters θ, and integration bounds a and b, tells
that
∂
∂θ
(∫ b(θ)
a(θ)
f (x, θ)
)
=
∫ 1
0
∂θf (x, θ) dx+ f (b (θ) , θ) .b
′ (θ)
− f (a (θ) , θ) .a′ (θ) (14)
Thus, the derivative of (13) with respect to Q is given by
∂O
∂Q
(Q,αc) =
∫ Q
0
[
λ∗,−αc + λbpt,− (1− αc)]f (x) dx
− [λspαcQ+ λcap (1− αc)Q] f (Q)
+
∫ 1
Q
[−λ∗,+αc − λcap (1− αc)]f (x) dx
+ [λspαcQ+ λcap (1− αc)Q] f (Q) (15)
The optimal bid is obtained by equating the derivative in (15)
to 0, then yielding an optimal quantile of the predictive cumu-
lative distribution function F for wind power generation at that
lead time
Q = F−1
[
λ∗,+αc + λcap (1− αc)
(λ∗,− + λ∗,+)αc + (λbpt,− + λcap) (1− αc)
]
(16)
Similarly, the derivative of (13) with respect to αc writes
∂O
∂αc
(Q,αc)=
∫ Q
0
[
λ∗,− (Q−x)−
λbpt,−(Q−x)− λspx+λcapx
]
f (x) dx
+
∫ 1
Q
[
λ∗,+ (x−Q)−λbpt,+ (x−Q)−λspx+ λcapx]f (x) dx
(17)
Equation (17) is a nonlinear equation in Q. Its solutions
determine the possible Q values that may be used. Note that
Eq. (13) is affine in αc, with the sign of the coefficient of αc
Fig. 4. Illustrative behaviour of Eq. (13) under different relations for energy
and reserve penalties. Note, that revenues are maximized for αc = 0 or 1, i.e.
the wind power producer participates fully in one market or the other.
depending on Q˜. This means that Eq. (13) will be maximized
for one of αc = 0 or αc = 1. Bids from this proportional strat-
egy will take place in either the energy or the reserve market,
but never in both (see Fig. 4). In this way, the energy bid is
equal to the total expected energy when the reserve penalty
is higher than the energy penalty (λbpt,−− > λ∗,−−), so total
availability is submitted to the energy market. On the con-
trary, when the energy penalty is higher than the reserve penalty
(λ∗,−− > λbpt,−−), the total expected power is submitted to the
primary reserve market.
B. Constant Strategy Optimization Problem
The constant strategy assumes that a certain amount of the
available power is fixed to participate in the primary reserve
market, while the remaining available power is submitted in
the energy market [26]. The strategy splits into three distinct
domains according to the relationship between the prices on
day-ahead markets, and the penalties for energy and reserve
deviations.
1) Normal Operation: Under current electricity markets
regulatory framework it is more advantageous for wind power
plants to provide energy than to provide reserve, since the
energy price is usually higher than the reserve price [37]. If
renewable energy producers are able to provide in reserve mar-
kets, market operators should ensure appropriate price signals
to provide incentive for wind power plants to offer their flexi-
bility [4]. I.e. the reserve price must be higher than the energy
price (λcap ≥ λsp). The normal operational hierarchy of elec-
tric power systems implies that not meeting a call for reserve
is worse than not producing the energy promised, such that
the reserve penalty should be higher than the energy regulation
penalty (λbpt,−− ≥ λ∗,−−). The derivation below assumes that
these relations hold. The derivation is also valid for the inverse
case λ∗,−− ≥ λbpt,−− and λsp ≥ λcap, but for the above rea-
sons, we expect that the inverse case is unlikely to occur in
practice.
Again assuming the wind power plant is a price-taker, the
expected available power Q, and the primary reserve offer
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Fig. 5. Regions of operation of constant strategy.
PR, are determined from a minimization of the expectation of
regulation and penalties costs. This writes
(Q˜, P˜R)= arg
E
min
Q,PR
{T ∗ +W ∗ − λspE∗ − λcapP ∗} (18)
This problem contains three different regions of operation
(Fig. 5): (i) observed wind energy lower than fixed reserve
offer PR ≥ Eobs, (ii) observed wind power between fixed
reserve offer and expected wind power Q ≥ Eobs ≥ PR, and
(iii) observed power higher than expected wind power Eobs ≥
Eexp.
The mathematical formulation which minimizes the total
expected costs (O) is as follows
O (Q,P r) =
∫ P r
0
[
λ∗,− (Q− P r)+
λbpt,− (P r − x)− λcapx
]
f (x) dx
+
∫ Q
P r
[
λ∗,− (Q− x)− λsp (x− P r)− λcapP r]f (x) dx
+
∫ 1
Q
[
λ∗,+ (x−Q)− λsp (x− P r)− λcapP r]f (x) dx
(19)
The integrals correspond respectively to the operation
regions 1, 2, and 3 in Fig. 5. We proceed to minimize this func-
tion by differentiation. The derivative of (19) with respect to Q
is given by
∂O
∂Q
(Q,P r) =
∫ P r
0
λ∗,−f (x) dx+
∫ Q
PR
λ∗,−f (x) dx
− [λsp (Q− P r) + λcapP r] f (Q) +
∫ 1
Q
−λ∗,+f (x) dx
+ [λsp (Q− P r) + λcapP r] f (Q) (20)
which leads to
Q = F−1
[
λ∗,+
λ∗,− + λ∗,+
]
(21)
The derivative of (18) with respect to P r is
∂O
∂P r
(Q,P r) =
∫ P r
0
[
λbpt,− − λ∗,−] f (x) dx
+
[
λ∗,−(Q−P r)−λcapP r] f (P r)+∫ Q
P r
[λsp−λcap] f (x) dx
− [λ∗,−(Q−P r)−λcapP r] f (P r)+∫ 1
Q
[λsp−λcap] f (x) dx
(22)
This finally yields the optimal bid for reserve participation
P r = F−1
[
λcap − λsp
λbpt,− − λ∗,− + λcap − λsp
]
(23)
2) Special Operation—Reserve Only Market:: There are a
few cases where the strategy should be decoupled to participate
in a single reserve market: when the energy bid is negative –
only reserve market participation; and when λbpt,−− < λ∗,−−
and λcap ≥ λsp, the full availability of the wind producer
should be submitted to the reserve market.
In that case, the objective function is a special case of that in
Eq. (19), i.e.,
O (P r) =
∫ P r
0
[
λbpt,− (P r − x)− λcapx]f (x) dx
+
∫ 1
P r
[
λ∗,+ (x− P r)−
λsp (x− P r)− λcapP r
]
f (x) dx (24)
The derivative with respect to PR is obtained as
∂O
∂P r
(P r) =
∫ P r
0
λbpt,−f (x) dx − [λcapP r] f (P r)
+
∫ 1
P r
[
λsp − λ∗,+ − λcap]f (x) dx+ [λcapP r] f (P r)
(25)
resulting in the optimal quantile bid for reserve participation,
P r = F−1
(
λ∗,+ + λcap − λsp
λbpt,− + λ∗,+ + λcap − λsp
)
(26)
3) Special Operation—Energy Only Market: In cases
where λbpt,−− ≥ λ∗,−− and λcap < λsp, it is intuitive that the
wind power producer will opt to participate in the energy mar-
ket only. The objective function for this case is a particular case
of Eq. (19), given by
O (Q) =
∫ Q
0
[
λ∗,− (Q− x)− λspx]f (x) dx
+
∫ 1
Q
[
λ∗,+ (x−Q)− λspx]f (x) dx (27)
The derivative of (27) with respect to Eexp becomes
∂O
∂Q
(Q) =
∫ Q
0
λ∗,−f (x) dx+
∫ 1
Q
λ∗,+f (x) dx (28)
which results in the well-known quantile for energy-only par-
ticipation
Q = F−1
(
λ∗,+
λ∗,− + λ∗,+
)
(29)
C. Strategies Summary
A general overview of the analytical formulas to obtain opti-
mal offers in both markets and for both strategies is given in
Table I.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF OPTIMAL BIDS
TABLE II
PRICES AND PENALTIES IN ENERGY AND RESERVE MARKET
TABLE III
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR STRATEGIES BASED ON PROPORTIONAL,
CONSTANT, AND ENERGY-ONLY MARKET STRATEGY
TABLE IV
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR λcap LARGER THAN λsp FOR
PROPORTIONAL, CONSTANT, AND ENERGY-ONLY MARKET STRATEGIES
V. EVALUATION OF OFFERING STRATEGY
A. Test Cases
1) Base Case:: The base case is based on the follow-
ing parameters and assumptions. The wind power plant has
a 30 MW installed capacity. An example probabilistic wind
power forecasts takes the form of a beta distribution with shape
parameters α = 2 and β = 4. The expected revenue is evalu-
ated using 1000 samples for wind production drawn from this
distribution. Besides, Table II gathers the prices for energy and
reserve in our numerical example, as well as the unit penalty for
up and down deviations from contract.
The evaluation of the proportional strategy is performed by
an iterative process. αc is assumed to vary between 0 and 1 with
steps of 0.03. Q is determined based on Eq. (16) for each αc.
The total revenue for each given αc is determined.
The constant strategy is first analyzed based on the most real-
istic assumption on the relation between penalties and market
prices, i.e., such that λbpt,−− ≥ λ∗,−− and λcap ≥ λsp. In this
case, Eqs. (21) and (23) are used to determine the energy and
the reserve bid, respectively.
Fig. 6. Objective function behavior for constant strategy, based on base case
data.
Fig. 7. Expected revenue for constant strategy under variation of day-ahead
energy and primary reserve market prices.
Fig. 8. Expected share of energy and reserve for constant strategy under vari-
ation of day-ahead energy and primary reserve market prices. Dashed lines
represents the primary reserve share for each case of primary reserve price (case
1 – reserve price of 25 C/MW; case 2 – reserve price of 35 C/MW; and case 3
– reserve price of 50 C/MW).
Table III shows a comparison between three different strate-
gies for participation in electricity markets (proportional, con-
stant and energy-only). The expected revenue is the difference
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TABLE V
CUMULATIVE SIMULATION RESULTS OF TWO YEARS DATA FOR PROPORTIONAL, CONSTANT, AND ENERGY-ONLY MARKET STRATEGIES
Fig. 9. Constant and proportional strategies behavior over the time, under real data adapted from [13].
between the expected inflow and expected costs (defined in
Sect. IV). The energy-only strategy is based on the common
newsvendor problem [13]. Thus, the quantile for this strategy
is given by Eq. (29). Observing the behavior of the strategies
in Table III, one can verify that constant strategy has higher
expected return than the other strategies.
2) Full Reserve Case: Assuming that λcap is much larger
than λsp, for instance λcap = 40 C/MW, the strategies may
split the energy and reserve bids differently. Table IV compare
the strategies participation in both energy and primary reserve
market for this capacity price.
One can verify that there is a change in the behavior of both
proposed strategies. Both strategies allocate all the available
energy to the primary reserve market. This is since the rev-
enue from the primary reserve market is much higher than the
revenue from the energy market. Both proposed strategies get
better results than the energy-only strategy.
B. Constant Strategy Behavior
1) Objective Function Behavior: The objective function for
the base case is depicted in Fig. 6. One can verify that this func-
tion is convex, allowing to obtain a unique optimal solution. The
expected reserve bid can never be higher than the total expected
energy, hence the triangular cutoff for higher expected reserve.
2) Constant Strategy Performance Under Different Spot and
Primary Reserve Market Prices: The behavior of the constant
strategy strongly depends on the difference between day-ahead
energy and primary reserve market prices. Fig. 7 depicts the
behavior of the strategy under different spot and reserve market
prices. The simulation is performed under the base case data
with variation in spot and primary reserve prices.
The spot prices varies between 17 and 32 C/MWh, while the
primary reserve market price is represented by three cases, 25,
35 and 50 C/MW, respectively.
The simulation shows that increasing primary reserve price
leads to higher revenue, as expected. As long as the spot price
increases, the expected revenue increases too, since the strategy
splits its available power for energy and reserve. Thus, as long
as one of the day-ahead energy spot or capacity price improves,
the revenue tends to increase.
Fig. 8 illustrates the dependency of the share of the offers
into the energy and reserve markets as a function of day-ahead
energy and reserve capacity prices. The reserve share tends
to reduce with the increase of the spot price, as expected.
However, at a certain point, the reserve market no longer gen-
erates higher profit than the energy market, making that full
availability is submitted to the energy market. This occurs when
the spot price is higher than 25 C/MWh. In case 1 (reserve price
of 25 C/MW) this occurs because the primary reserve penalty
is higher than the energy penalty, so there is no incentive to par-
ticipate in the primary reserve market. The intersection between
energy and reserve curve for case 1, gives precisely the result
of the base case for the constant strategy.
C. Strategies Behavior Over Time—Real Data
The data and assumptions used for simulation of both strate-
gies over time are the same used in [13]. We consider a wind
farm of 15 MW participating in the Nord Pool, where the wind
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farm data is based on power measurements and a series of 48 h-
ahead point predictions between March 2001 and April 2003
[13]. Nord Pool prices and penalties between 2001 and 2003
are used. Reserve penalty is assumed to be 50% higher than the
capacity price in the primary reserve market.
The cumulative data results for energy and revenue over the
two years for each strategy are shown in Table V. In overall, one
can see that the proportional strategy submits more power to the
energy and reserve markets than the constant strategy. In the
same perspective, the proportional strategy gets more expected
revenue than constant strategy. Furthermore, proportional and
constant strategies improve the revenue of wind power pro-
ducers relative to the energy-only strategy by about 12% and
3%, respectively. In addition, Table V provides a comparison
for each strategy between the expected results under forecast
scenarios and under deployed wind power.
Fig. 9 illustrates the different behavior of both proportional
and constant strategies over time. It can be seen that in most
of the periods, the constant strategy splits the available power
for participation in both markets. On contrary, the proportional
strategy tends to submit all the available power to one mar-
ket only. From the economic point of view, both strategies are
balanced. I.e., in some periods, the constant strategy may get
more revenue than the proportional one, however, the opposite
also occur. This is because of the different assumptions on the
formulation of each strategy, yielding different behavior in the
market.
VI. CONCLUSION
The increasing flexibility of wind power plants will allow
them to provide more market services, such as primary reserve,
in the future.
This work formulates and derives optimal offering strate-
gies for wind power plants participation in energy and primary
reserve markets. Two strategies (proportional and constant
reserve offering strategies) were considered. Both strategies
have different behavior and flexibility, however, they increase
wind power owners expected profits as compared to an energy-
only bid. The results show that such strategies provide addi-
tional profits in expectation. The proportional strategy leads
to a binary behavior where all the available energy is submit-
ted in either the energy or the reserve market. In contrast, the
constant strategy enables a joint participation of wind power
plants in both energy and primary reserve markets. In addition,
results show that these offering strategies strongly depend on
the market prices and penalties for energy and primary reserve.
An important conclusion from this work is that, even though
turbines may have the technical ability to provide reserves,
they may not always do so in the current market framework,
since the relative profitability and penalties in both energy
and reserve markets will drive the behavior of wind power
producers.
Future work will focus on improvements of the strategies
considering that the share for energy and reserve submit-
ted in the day-ahead market can change in the balancing
market.
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